The problem of evil has perplexed theologians for centuries. What are three common solutions? This article explores three common solutions to the problem of evil?
Three common solutions to the problem of evil are Finitism, the modification of God’s goodness, and the denial of evil (Erickson 1998, 439-45). Finitism is the repudiation of God’s omnipotence, the modification of God’s goodness regards God as the ultimate cause of sin, and the denial of evil deems the problem of evil irrelevant since it is absent (Erickson 1998, 439-45). The following analysis will evaluate Erickson’s response to these three common solutions.
Erickson (1998) addresses Finitism through Edgar S. Brightman’s personal idealism. Brightman’s God is an eternal and finite God who works with the “uncreated laws of reason” and the “uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness” (440). More specifically, Brightman believes surd evil exists not because God is finite, but because God’s will is finite and argues that an evil “something” uncreated by God must exist in order to further humanity’s motivation to overcome it (Erickson 1998, 440-442). Erickson (1998) concedes that Brightman in some ways solves the problem of evil, but appropriately refutes the philosopher’s denial of God’s omnipotence (441-442). Alternatively, Erickson (1998) supports Wieman’s assertion that Brightman’s God is a deity with a bifurcated nature, which questions God’s goodness (442). Finally, it appears Erickson (1998) could have extended his critique of Brightman’s absurd notion that Finitism somehow appropriately motivates humanity to participate in the struggle to overcome evil (440-442).
The alteration of God’s goodness as a solution to the problem of evil is addressed by Erickson’s (1998) explanation of Gordon H. Clark’s proposal (442). Clark’s deterministic view of God unabashedly “makes God the cause of sin” (Erickson 1998, 443). Clark clarifies this controversial phrase by suggesting that the procuring cause of a sin event does not necessitate the performance of the event, thus God “does not commit sin” (Erickson 1998, 443). Erickson (1998) refutes Clark’s emphasis on the similar obligations of God and humanity, his suggestion that the will of God is random, and his notion that God “cannot be responsible” (444). Erickson’s (1998) most poignant critique refutes Clark’s inappropriate link between accountability and morality (443-444). However, by acquiescing to the potential efficacy of low level behaviorism, Erickson (1998) does not go far enough (444). Erickson (1998) could have further refuted Clark’s spurious assertion that “man is responsible because God calls him to account” by accentuating that a believer’s pursuit of morality is an extension of goodness powered by God, as opposed to an egocentric act of self-preservation (444).
Erickson (1998) spends considerable time addressing Christian Science’s solution to the problem of evil, which simply denies evil exists (445). Christian Science believes that evil is simply “a false belief,” thus even disease is an illusion (445). Erickson (1998) responds to Christian Science by noting that disease continues so evil has obviously not been extinguished, the illusion is not explained by its proponents, and the theories are simply not effective (446). Erickson’s (1998) analysis regarding Christian Science is correct (445-46).
References
Erickson, M. J. 1998. Christian Theology. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic.
