LUTHER SALVATION
Iustitia Dei – The Distinct Breakthrough
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of justification is certainly one of the most influential concepts underlying the Protestant Reformation. Accordingly, the distinct breakthrough Luther experienced regarding iustitia Dei, the righteousness of God, within the context of the Protestant doctrine of justification has been a topic of significant debate. This paper will prove that Luther’s view of the nature of iustitia Dei culminates in an iustitia Christi aliena, which characterizes Luther’s distinct breakthrough.
The forthcoming study will provide a brief etymological introduction of iustitia Dei followed by an analysis of Luther’s break with the theology of his peers, the via moderna. The distinct nature of Luther’s breakthrough will then be revealed in his divergence with Augustine. An engaging exploration of potential traditional alternatives to Luther’s distinct breakthrough will be explored, and finally, a fascinating look into a possible non-traditional alternative embodied in Ritschlian theology will be investigated.
IUSTITIA DEI
Iustitia Dei is a Latin term defined as the justice or righteousness of God.[1] However, the meaning is much less conspicuous than the definition conveys. In fact, Paul’s view of iustitia Dei continues to be debated with no definitive conclusions in sight.[2] The meaning of iustitia Dei has altered through history as it has transitioned from Hebrew, Greek, and, finally, into the Latin language. However, it plays a crucial role in understanding Luther’s theological developments.
According to Alister McGrath the Hebrew terms normally translated ‘righteousness’ are sedeq and sedaqa, which have a plethora of potential meanings, but are based on a “conformity to a norm.” The oldest meaning of sedaqa appears to be ‘victory’ and includes not only a retributive aspect regarding Israel’s enemies, but also a salvific aspect regarding God’s people. The covenantal quality of iustitia Dei in the Old Testament consistently leads to a connection between “moral and salvific orders.”[3]
The Greek term used in the Septuagint for ‘righteousness’ is dikaiosyne.[4] By the time of the LXX dikaiosyne had already been influenced by the Aristotelian thought of iustitia distributive – “giving a person their due.”[5] Aristotle’s ethics placed ‘righteousness’ within a political context based on the benefit it brings to a political community.[6] Accordingly, the secularized Aristotelian concept of ‘righteousness’ is void of the soteriological implications of the Hebrew term.[7]
By the time of Jerome’s Vulgate the Latin term iustitia had a legal connotation that would have significant influence on future theological thought.[8] The Ciceronian definition of iustitia established by second century AD was “to render to all their due.”[9] Again, all Hebraic covenantal connections between God and humanity and any soteriological implications are absent.[10] Furthermore, church theologians for the first fifteen hundred years of scholarship relied on the Latin Vulgate and few had access the etymology of iustitia Dei in the original Hebrew.[11] It was within this historically juristic backdrop of ‘righteousness’ that Luther experienced his distinct breakthrough of the meaning of iustitia Dei that powerfully impacted the Reformation.
LUTHER’S BREAK WITH THE VIA MODERNA
“I hated that word iustitia Dei.”[12] This candid reflection from Luther’s famous preface to the first volume of an edition of his works written in 1545 was based on the training young Luther had received from his teachers who, consistent with theologians of the Middle Ages, defined iustitia Dei as an active righteousness whereby “God is righteous and punishes the unrighteous sinner.”[13] This early view of iustitia Dei referred to in the Preface is foundational to Luther’s early thought.
Luther’s early view of iustitia Dei is connected with the via moderna.[14] The via moderna was based on the idea that once a man meets the requirements of God by doing ‘what lies within him’, quod in se est, then God will confer the gift of justifying grace.[15] The entire theological tradition of medieval theology from the twelfth century to the beginning of the sixteenth century believed justification was obtained in this manner.[16] Unfortunately, the theological view of the via moderna regarding man’s precise obligation to God caused significant uncertainty regarding whether a man had met the requirements.[17] Accordingly, Luther was abundantly grateful for the “wonderful new definition of righteousness” obtained sometime during 1515 that would solve the dilemma.[18]
Three theological modifications led to Luther’s break with the via moderna, which included an insistence that humans are passive in their justification, incapable of attaining righteousness without divine grace, and unable to do quod in se est without being considered Pelagian.[19] Luther reflects on his new definition of iustitia Dei later in life that originated from the three theological insights:
At last, by the mercy of God, meditating day and night, I gave heed to the context of the words, namely, ‘In the righteousness of God is revealed, as it is written, He who through faith is righteous shall live.’ There I began to understand that the righteousness of God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God, namely by faith. And this is the meaning: the righteousness of God is revealed by the gospel, namely, the passive righteousness with which merciful God justifies us by faith, as it is written, ‘He who through faith is righteous shall live.’ Here I felt that I was altogether born again and had entered paradise itself through open gates. There a totally other face of the entire Scripture showed itself to me.[20]
Although Luther now understands that iustitia Dei pertains to a righteousness that justifies the ungodly, as opposed to a righteousness that represents a just God, and a significant break had occurred from the theological nature of the via moderna, it is important to note that Luther’s reference in his Preface in 1545 is not distinct.[21] In fact, Luther was pleased to find that in Augustine’s On the Spirit and the Letter the righteousness of God was interpreted “not that whereby He is Himself righteous, but that with which He endows man when He justifies the ungodly.”[22] In order to identify the distinct nature of Luther’s breakthrough it is necessary to turn to the Roman’s Lectures (1515-16).
LUTHER’S BREAK WITH AUGUSTINE
Luther’s break with Augustine is based on the anthropological assertion that a believer is simul iustus et peccator, simultaneously righteous and a sinner.[23] Luther’s understanding of simul iustus et peccator originates from a holistic view of humanity that reaches its logical conclusions in Luther’s distinct breakthrough – iustitia Christi aliena.[24] Although Karl Holl aggressively believed Luther’s doctrine of justification had reached a conclusion by 1516, most would at least agree the foundation of Luther’s thought regarding his doctrine did exist, although in an Augustinian framework, by the time the Roman’s Lectures (1515-16) were complete.[25]
Luther believes that “flesh” and “spirit” are not bifurcated, but regarded as unique aspects of the whole person. His belief is well represented in his Roman’s Lectures:
But if the mind, the carnal man, dies a spiritual death, we are already dead to the Law in the whole person, and so also we are liberated in our whole person. Whether the apostle now looks at the flesh or at the spirit, we are still the same unit…He does not want to lust, and he judges that it is a good thing not to lust, and yet he lusts and does not carry out his own will, and thus he is fighting with himself; but because the spirit and the flesh are so intimately bound together into one, although they completely disagree with each other, therefore he attributes to himself as a whole person the work of both of them, as if he were at the same time completely flesh and completely spirit.[26]
According to Luther, a person cannot be part righteous and part sinner, thus, iustitia Dei is extended to the whole person who is considered iustus et peccator simul – inherently a sinner, but extrinsically righteous.[27] Luther’s holistic view of humanity is noted in the famous reference to the Parable of the Good Samaritan in his Roman’s Lectures:
It is similar to the case of a sick man who believes the doctor who promises him a sure recovery and in the meantime obeys the doctor’s order in the hope of the promised recovery and abstains from those things which have been forbidden him, so that he may in no way hinder the promised return to health or increase his sickness until the doctor can fulfill his promise to him. Now is this sick man well? The fact is that he is both sick and well at the same time. He is sick in fact, but he is well because of the sure promise of the doctor, whom he trusts and who has reckoned him as already cured, because he is sure that he will cure him; for he has already begun to cure him and no longer reckons to him a sickness unto death. In the same way Christ, our Samaritan, has brought His half-dead man into the inn to be cared for, and He has begun to heal him, having promised him the most complete cure unto eternal life, and He does not impute his sins, that is, his wicked desires, unto death, but in the meantime in the hope of the promised recovery He prohibits him from doing or omitting things by which his cure might be impeded and his sin, that is, his concupiscence, might be increased. Now, is he perfectly righteous? No, for he is at the same time both a sinner and a righteous man; [simul iustus et peccator] a sinner in fact, but a righteous man by the sure imputation and promise of God that He will continue to deliver him from sin until He has completely cured him.[28]
In other words, based on Luther’s anthropological assessments, man is neither being made righteous nor treated as if he was righteous, but man, while a sinner, is completely righteous in actuality by the clothing of the iustitia Christi aliena, the alien righteousness of Christ, which, as will be shown, breaks with Augustinian thought.[29]
Although Luther’s justifying righteousness is in agreement with Augustine regarding its nature, it departs significantly in regards to its location.[30] For Augustine, operative grace was intrinsic and could move a believer toward “becoming righteous.” [31] Luther disagreed with any notion that a believer could “become righteous,” instead, his view of extrinsic righteousness would actually cause believers to be more aware of their unrighteousness and impel them back to the cross.[32] In fact, iustitia Christi aliena “has no Augustinian parallel.”[33]
It has now been shown that Luther’s discovery is distinct from the via moderna in nature and distinct from Augustine in location. Luther’s new Augustinian view of the nature of iustitia Dei, a righteousness that justifies the ungodly, that culminates in the identification of the location of iustitia Dei, a righteousness in iustitia Christi aliena, characterizes Luther’s distinct breakthrough. Although Luther’s distinct breakthrough has been identified, it is necessary to investigate potential alternative views.
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS
There are a number of alternative views of iustitia Dei associated with the Reformation that may be examined when attempting to identify Luther’s distinct breakthrough. Three possibilities will be explored including the concept of imputation, the reunification of Christ’s righteousness with God’s justice, and the impact of Christ’s presence. All fall short of fulfilling the requirements to qualify as Luther’s distinct breakthrough, but do fulfill complimentary roles to a traditional analysis of Luther.
First, Timothy George appropriately identifies imputation as one of the essential features of Luther’s new view of justification.[34] More specifically, he explains that the alien righteousness of Christ does not eliminate sin, but it no longer has the power to indict due to the forensic nature of the Christ’s righteousness.[35] George also correctly points out that for Luther a more appropriate interpretation of Paul’s Greek verb was “to declare righteous” as opposed to the Augustinian interpretation, which was “to make righteous.”[36] All the tenants of George are valid, but care must be taken as Luther did not “teach a doctrine of forensic justification in the strict sense.”[37] A strict view of forensic justification requires a distinction between justification and sanctification, which was certainly a characteristic of the Reformation, but “no part of Luther’s thought.”[38] Luther’s extrinsic view of righteousness did lay a foundation for Melanchthon’s strict doctrine of imputation, but to suggest the concept of imputation was distinctly Luther would go further than the evidence supports.[39]
Second, Heiko Oberman posits a thought provoking hypothesis suggesting that Luther’s discovery can be summarized in one sentence: “the heart of the Gospel is that the iustitia Christi and the iustitia Dei coincide and are granted simultaneously.”[40] Oberman points out that in the Middle Ages “iustitia Christi” was sacramentally procured, but there continued to be additional requirements in order to obtain “iustitia Dei.”[41] Furthermore, to assist in proving his thesis via elimination, Oberman explains that Luther’s distinct discovery of iustitia Dei could be neither that grace was always prevenient, which was the theme of the medieval anti-pelagian argument, nor could it be that a “sinner is justified through sanctifying grace” and receives iustitia Christi, for the Thomists and Scotists had already furthered this argument.[42] Instead, Luther’s discovery was that iustitia Dei was revealed through iustitia Christi.[43] Without question Oberman makes a valid point and provides appropriate distinctions with medieval theologians, but unfortunately, does not explicitly distinguish his view from Augustine. Oberman’s thesis properly addresses the forensic nature of Luther’s discovery, but ignores the extrinsic location; thus, it falls short of distinguishing itself from Augustine.[44]
Finally, a more recent analysis regarding the distinctiveness of Luther’s teaching on justification has arisen from the ‘Finnish School’, which places an emphasis on a believer’s “actual participation in the divine life through union with Christ.”[45] According to the Finnish view, Christ’s presence is identical with the righteousness that exists via faith.[46] The following exemplifies the Finnish School’s emphasis within Luther’s writings:
The third incomparable benefit of faith is that it unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom. By this mystery, as the Apostle teaches, Christ and the soul become one flesh [Eph. 5:31–32]. And if they are one flesh and there is between them a true marriage—indeed the most perfect of all marriages, since human marriages are but poor examples of this one true marriage—it follows that everything they have they hold in common, the good as well as the evil. Accordingly the believing soul can boast of and glory in whatever Christ has as though it were its own, and whatever the soul has Christ claims as his own.[47]
The Finnish approach certainly accentuates the forensic nature of justification and provides a fresh perspective on its transformational message, but it is not Luther’s distinct breakthrough.[48] Instead, it is a natural extension or result of Luther’s emphasis on the relational aspects of his distinctly extrinsic breakthrough of iustitia Christi aliena.
RITSCHL ON LUTHER
It would be difficult to ignore Albrecht Ritschl, the influential German liberal theologian, in any discussion on iustitia Dei within the context of the Reformation. Ritschl’s goal as a theologian was to complete the Reformation by bringing Protestantism, and especially Luther, to theological maturity through his magnum opus, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation.[49] More specifically, Ritschl concludes the basis of Luther’s theology is not the doctrine of justification, but “the thought of the abiding revelation of love as the essence of God in Christ.”[50] A brief explanation of Ritschl’s view will be provided followed by a polemic that disproves that Ritschl adequately encompasses Luther’s distinct breakthrough.
According to Ritschl’s interpretation of Luther, iustitia Dei was existentially appropriated to man by living in the love and trust of God, which led to a moral life through a community of believers.[51] In other words, iustitia Dei was not a theological dictum, but an experience of assurance that led to a Christian life of freedom and joy that paradoxically was subject to no man, but morally obligated to all.[52] Furthermore, Ritschl believed Luther’s evolution of thought as a result of mounting Roman Catholic pressure disintegrated and gradually inhabited a cold, rational, and purely forensic doctrine of justification, which led to a distorted pietistic view that made justification dependent on the degree of sanctification that ultimately produced a “revivalist form of legalism.”[53]
It is evident that Ritschl reinforced a number of Luther’s essential themes. For example, there is certainly a strong existential element as well as a unity of justification and sanctification, subsequently detached by Melanchthon, central to Luther’s theology.[54] However, according to David Lotz’s work, Ritschl & Luther, Ritschl missed that Luther’s justification spawns a new creature and does not properly emphasize simul justus et peccator.[55] Furthermore, Ritschl’s implication that man can find a moral ideal in Christ appears exceedingly incongruent with Luther’s view of regeneration.[56] Accordingly, Ritschl’s view of Luther’s iustitia Dei is “not only dubious, but patently defective.”[57] To suggest that Ritschl is not a major contributor would be inappropriate, but to connect Ritschl’s understanding of Luther’s iustitia Dei as representative of Luther’s distinct breakthrough would be reckless.
CONCLUSION
The influence of Luther’s distinct view of iustitia Dei cannot be underestimated in either its scope or its impact on the history of doctrine of justification. Luther’s concept of iustitia Dei lays the framework for the Reformative development of the doctrine. It has been shown that Luther’s Augustinian view of the nature of iustitia Dei culminated in a righteousness located in iustitia Christi aliena, which characterizes Luther’s distinct breakthrough and aligns with the true soteriological Hebraic meaning of iustitia Dei.[58] Furthermore, the traditional potential alternatives that include imputation as discussed by George, reunification of Christ’s righteousness with God’s justice as purported by Oberman, and the presence of Christ as maintained by the Finnish School all fall short of fulfilling the requirements of Luther’s distinct breakthrough. Finally, the possibility of Ritschl’s revelation of love perspective qualifying as a distinct breakthrough of Luther has been thwarted. Of course, to suggest that Luther had no additional subsequent breakthroughs would be a grievous mistake, but to conclude that any successive breakthroughs regarding the doctrine of justification are built upon the nature of Luther’s distinct breakthrough that culminated in iustitia Christi aliena is not unreasonable. For further study on the doctrine of the doctrine of justification, Alister McGrath’s comprehensive Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification is considered to be the most thorough treatment of the history of the doctrine since Albrecht Ritschl’s more liberal treatment in A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation.
[1]Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1995), 164.
[2]Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification (New York: Cambridge University, 2005), 21.
[3]Ibid., 8-10.
[4]Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, 93.
[5]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 14.
[6]Aristotle, Politics I 1253a 2- 3.
[7]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 15.
[8]Ibid., 16.
[9]W. Lucas Collins, Cicero: Ancient Classics for English Readers (Middlesex, UK: Echo Library, 2007), 92-93.
[10]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 17.
[11]Ibid., 16.
[12]Martin Luther, “Preface to the Complete Edition of Luther’s Latin Writings, 1545,” in Career of the Reformer IV, ed. Lewis W. Spitz, trans. Lewis W. Spitz, vol. 34 of Luther’s Works (LW), American ed., ed. Jarosalav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1965), 336.
[13]Ibid.
[14]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 219.
[15]Alister E. McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1985), 86.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Alister E. McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough, second ed. (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 177.
[18]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 221-22.
[19]Ibid., 220-21.
[20]Luther, “Preface to the Complete Edition of Luther’s Latin Writings, 1545,” LW, 34: 337.
[21]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 222.
[22]Saint Augustin, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Volume 5: Augustin: Anti-Pelagian Writings, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 88-89.
[23]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 226.
[24]McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough, 182-83.
[25]James F. McCue, “"Simul Iustus Et Peccator" in Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther: Toward Putting the Debate in Context,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 48, no. 1 (March 1980): III, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1463542 (accessed May 29, 2011).
[26]Martin Luther, “Lectures on Romans,” in Scholia, ed. Hilton C. Oswald, trans. Jacob A. O. Preus, vol. 25 of Luther’s Works (LW), American ed., ed. Jarosalav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1965), 332-33.
[27]McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough, 182-83.
[28]Luther, “Lectures on Romans,” LW, 25: 260.
[29]Alister E. McGrath, “Forerunners of the Reformation?: A Critical Examination of the Evidence for Precursors of the Reformation Doctrines of Justification,” The Harvard Theological Review 75, no. 2 (April 1982): I, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509561 (accessed June 7, 2011).
[30]Ibid., II.
[31]Alister E. McGrath, Luther's of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough, second ed. (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 184.
[32]Ibid.
[33]McGrath, “Forerunners of the Reformation?: A Critical Examination of the Evidence for Precursors of the Reformation Doctrines of Justification,” II.
[34]Timothy George, Theology of the Reformers (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1988), 69.
[35]Ibid.
[36]Ibid., 70.
[37]McGrath, “Forerunners of the Reformation?: A Critical Examination of the Evidence for Precursors of the Reformation Doctrines of Justification,” I.
[38]Ibid., I-II.
[39]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 229.
[40]Heiko A. Oberman, “"Iustitia Christi" and "Iustitia Dei": Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification,” Harvard Theological Review 59, no. 1 (January 1966): 19.
[41]Ibid.
[42]Ibid., 19.
[43]Ibid.
[44]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 213.
[45]Ibid., 225.
[46]Ibid.
[47]Martin Luther, “The Freedom of a Christian,” in Career of the Reformer I, ed. Harold J. Grimm, trans. W. A. Lambert, vol. 31 of Luther’s Works (LW), American ed., ed. Jarosalav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1965), 351.
[48]McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 225.
[49]David W. Lotz, “Albrecht Ritschl and the Unfinished Reformation,” Harvard Theological Review 73, no. 3-4 (July-October 1980): 339.
[50]Terrence Reynolds, “Ritschl's Appropriation of Luther,” A Reappraisal 55, no. 2-3 (April-July 1991): 106.
[51]Ibid.
[52]Ibid., 107.
[53]Ibid., 109-111.
[54]Ibid., 120.
[55]David W. Lotz, Ritschl & Luther: A Fresh Perspective on Albrecht Ritschl's Theology in the Light of His Luther Study (New York: Abingdon, 1974), 98-104.
[56]Reynolds, “Ritschl's Appropriation of Luther,” 121.
[57]Lotz, Ritschl & Luther: A Fresh Perspective on Albrecht Ritschl's Theology in the Light of His Luther Study, 105.
[58]McGrath, “Forerunners of the Reformation?: A Critical Examination of the Evidence for Precursors of the Reformation Doctrines of Justification,” II.
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———. Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1985.
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